

Solutions to the Exercises of Section 1.7.

1.7.1(a) The minimax point is the intersection of the line joining $(-2, 3)$ to $(-3/4, -9/4)$ and the line $x = y$. The former line has slope $-21/5$ and equation

$$y - 3 = (-21/5)(x + 2).$$

Putting $y = x$ and solving yields $x = y = -27/26$. Therefore the minimax point is $(-27/26, -27/26)$. The minimax rule is the randomized rule that mixes d_1 (associated with the point $(-2, 3)$) and d_2 (associated with $(-3/4, -9/4)$) with probabilities p and $1 - p$ with p chosen so that

$$(-27/26, -27/26) = p(-2, 3) + (1 - p)(-3/4, -9/4).$$

Solving for p gives $p = 3/13$. The minimax risk is $-27/26$.

(b) Since the line on which the minimax point lies has slope $-21/5$, the prior distribution $(p, 1 - p)$ with respect to which the minimax rule is Bayes is a vector with slope $5/21$. Solving

$$(1 - p)/p = 5/21$$

for p yields $p = 21/26$. This prior distribution, θ_1 w.p. $21/26$ and θ_2 w.p. $5/26$, is also least favorable.

(c) The prior distribution $(1/2, 1/2)$ is perpendicular to lines of slope -1 , so we search for a point on the lower boundary such that the line with slope -1 through this point is tangent to the risk set. Since the line joining $(-2, 3)$ to $(-3/4, -9/4)$ has slope $-27/26 < -1$ and the slope of the line joining $(-3/4, -9/4)$ to $(3, -4)$ is $-7/15 > -1$, the point $(-3/4, -9/4)$ is the Bayes point and the nonrandomized rule d_2 is Bayes with respect to $(1/2, 1/2)$. The minimum Bayes risk is $(1/2)(-3/4) + (1/2)(-9/4) = -2$.

1.7.2. Let \mathcal{C} be any collection of convex sets in some space, and let

$$A = \bigcap_{C \in \mathcal{C}} C.$$

To show A convex, let $x \in A$, $y \in A$, and $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$, and try to show that $\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y \in A$. Since $x \in A$ and $y \in A$, we have for every $C \in \mathcal{C}$ that $x \in C$ and $y \in C$. Then since every $C \in \mathcal{C}$ is convex, we have $\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y \in C$ for every $C \in \mathcal{C}$. This implies $\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y \in A$ as was to be shown.

1.7.3. Someone tosses a fair coin until the first tails appears and announces X , the outcome of the experiment, but neglects to tell you whether X is the number of heads observed ($\theta = 1$), or the total number of tosses ($\theta = 0$). The set of possible outcomes he may announce is $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$. You must decide whether $\theta = 0$ or $\theta = 1$ with zero/one loss. The set of nonrandomized decision rules is $D = \{d : d(x) = 0 \text{ or } 1, \text{ for } x = 0, 1, \dots\}$. To find the risk set, S , we first find the nonrandomized risk set S_0 , and then find its convex hull. For a given rule, d , the risk point is $(R(0, d), R(1, d))$ where

$$\begin{aligned} R(0, d) &= 0 \cdot P(d(X) = 0 | \theta = 0) + 1 \cdot P(d(x) = 1 | \theta = 0) \\ &= P(d(X) = 1 | \theta = 0) = \sum_{\substack{x \geq 1 \\ d(x)=1}} 2^{-x} \\ R(1, d) &= P(d(X) = 0 | \theta = 1) = \sum_{\substack{x \geq 0 \\ d(x)=0}} 2^{-(x+1)} \end{aligned}$$

As important examples, the four rules,

$$\begin{aligned} d_1(x) &= 1 && \text{for all } x. \\ d_2(x) &= 1 && \text{for } x = 0 \text{ and } d_2(x) = 0 \text{ for all } x > 0. \\ d_3(x) &= 0 && \text{for } x = 0 \text{ and } d_3(x) = 1 \text{ for all } x > 0. \\ d_4(x) &= 0 && \text{for all } x. \end{aligned}$$

have risk points $(1,0)$, $(0,1/2)$, $(1,1/2)$, and $(0,1)$, respectively. For a general rule d , we distinguish two cases: if $d(0) = 0$, then $R(1, d) = 1/2 + (1/2)(1 - R(0, d))$, so that the point $(R(0, d), R(1, d))$ falls on the line segment from $(0,1)$ to $(1,1/2)$; if $d(0) = 1$, then $R(1, d) = (1/2)(1 - R(0, d))$, so that the point $(R(0, d), R(1, d))$ falls on the line segment from $(0,1/2)$ to $(1,0)$. The risk set therefore consists of the parallelogram between the four points $(0,1/2)$, $(1,0)$, $(1,1/2)$, and $(0,1)$. The minimax point lies at the intersection of the line from $(0,1/2)$ to $(1,0)$ (equation $y = (-1/2)(x - 1)$), and the diagonal line $x = y$, namely $(1/3, 1/3)$. The minimax rule chooses d_1 with probability p and d_2 with probability $1 - p$, where

$$p \cdot (1, 0) + (1 - p) \cdot (0, 1/2) = (1/3, 1/3).$$

Solving for p gives $p = 1/3$. Since the slope of the line from $(1,0)$ to $(0,1/2)$ is $-1/2$, the least favorable distribution chooses $\theta = 0$ w.p. q , and $\theta = 1$ w.p. $1 - q$, where

$$(1 - q)/q = 2.$$

Solving for q gives $q = 1/3$. There is in fact a nonrandomized minimax rule, namely the rule, d^* , that chooses $\theta = 1$ if X is even and $\theta = 0$ if X is odd:

$$\begin{aligned} R(0, d^*) &= 1/4 + 1/16 + 1/64 + \dots = 1/3, \\ R(1, d^*) &= (1/2)(1 - 1/3) = 1/3. \end{aligned}$$

1.7.4. The risk set S consists of the line segment joining the point $((2P - 1)(a + b), (2P - 1)a + Pb)$ to the point $(a, (2P - 1)a)$. The first point is above the line $x = y$, and the second point is below. There are two cases, depending on whether the slope of the line is positive or negative. If $P > (2a + b)/(2a + 2b)$, the slope of the line is positive and the minimax point is the lower point, $(a, (2P - 1)a)$ with minimax value, a . This corresponds to the “fold” strategy of player II. The maximin choice for player I is the “bluff” strategy, which gives him the first coordinate, value a , which is greater than the second coordinate, value $(2P - 1)a$.

If $P < (2a + b)/(2a + 2b)$, the slope of the line is negative and the minimax point will be the point on this line with $x = y$. This line has slope $m = -Pb/(a - (2P - 1)(a + b))$ and equation $y - (2P - 1)a = m(x - a)$. Putting $x = y$ and solving gives

$$x = (2P - 1 - m)a/(1 - m) = a(4(a + b)P - (2a + b))/(2a + b)$$

as the minimax value. The minimax strategy of II chooses “call” with probability p and “fold” with probability $1 - p$, where p is chosen so that

$$p(2P - 1)(a + b) + (1 - p)a = x.$$

This gives

$$p = (x - a)/((2P - 1)(a + b) - a) = 2a/(2a + b).$$

It is interesting to note that this probability is independent of P ; player II does not need to know the probability that player I has a winning card in order to play optimally (provided $P < (2a + b)/(2a + 2b)$.) To find player I’s maximin strategy, we set $(1 - q)/q$ equal to the negative of the slope, $(1 - q)/q = -1/m$, and solve for q :

$$q = Pb/((1 - P)(2a + b)).$$

Player I should use the “bluff” strategy with probability q and the “honest” strategy with probability $1 - q$.